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ABSTRACT
This article examines the evolution of patron–client relationships in
Greece, Spain, and Turkey through the prism of the rural–urban
divide. It traces which modes of clientelism (rural or urban) are
more evident in these countries today, and why. Further, it finds
that in rural modes of clientelism, normative bonds of deference
and loyalty with a Weberian notion of ‘traditional authority’ and
affective ties between political patrons and clients are more
observable whereas urban modes of clientelism usually yield
Downsian competition between political machines with more
coercive motives. It suggests that these two notions of clientelism
are not mutually exclusive but should rather be seen in a
continuum. More generally, this article demonstrates the need in
the existing literature for more contextualized analyses that take
into account differences between socioeconomic and







Main puzzles in the clientelism literature today revolve around three major questions: How
does clientelism work?; What causes or prevents shifts away from clientelism?; Is cliente-
lism, along with other kinds of distributive politics, consistent with the norms of democ-
racy, and why? (Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007; Stokes, Dunning, Nazareno, & Busco, 2013).
This paper attempts to address the first two questions (it does not deal with the normative
aspect of clientelism), by theoretically analysing different modes of clientelism (urban vs.
rural), in light of three comparative cases, Greece, Spain, and Turkey. Taking into account
these theoretical and empirical investigations, the article deals with the reflections of cli-
entelism in contemporary politics. It argues that rural vs. urban modes of patron–client
relationships differ sufficiently enough for a theoretical investigation. Further, an empirical
discussion of this rural–urban divide in clientelism, in light of the Greek, Spanish, and
Turkish cases consolidates the conviction that this theoretical distinction has real-life
implications.
The structure of this paper is as follows. In the following section, a brief overview of the
clientelism literature is first provided. Then, specific attention is paid to the rural–urban
divide in patron–client relationships. The article highlights the need in the existing
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literature for more contextualized analyses that take into account differences between
socioeconomic and geographical antecedents of rural vs. urban clientelism and their diver-
gent political reflections. Section 3 sets forth the discussion of different modes of patron-
age networks in three Southern European countries, that is, Greece, Spain, and Turkey.
In-depth historical analyses of political and socioeconomic changes are provided so as
to understand the evolution of clientelism in these countries. Last section discusses the
current state of patronage systems in these countries and underlines which modes of
clientelism (rural or urban) are more evident in these countries today and why.
2. Rural–urban divide in clientelism
Before delving into the specifics of this paper, it would be appropriate to start with what
we understand by ‘patron–client relationships’ and why we should be interested in these
relationships. Older notions of clientelism underline dyadic and reciprocal nature of socio-
political relationships between individuals of higher socioeconomic status (patron) and
persons of lower status (client) (see for instance, Kaufman, 1974; Lande, 1973; Lémarchand
& Legg, 1972; Powell, 1970; Scott, 1972; Theobald, 1983). I conceptualize clientelism as
selective, particularistic, and hierarchical mutual support systems (be it at the dyadic or
community level) through a multitude of favours to electors in exchange for political
support (usually votes) (cf. Alamdari, 2005; Ansell & Mitchell, 2011; Auyero, 1999;
Burgwal, 1995; Chaves, 2002; Corstange, in press; Garcia-Guadilla, 2002; Keating, 1999;
Lauth, 2000; Levitsky & Way, 2012; Lindberg & Morrison, 2008).
Comprehending patron–client relationships is illuminating for domestic power politics
in a country (see Anderson, 1967, pp. 89–93; Scott, 1967, p. 127). Even the most centralized
governments have utilized the intertwined web of patron–client relationships and del-
egated power to notables in the periphery so as to continue and if possible strengthen
their political clout at the centre. Clientelism, in this regard, enables politicians to minimize
electoral risk via targeting their core constituencies and true partisans whose electoral
support is certain (Diaz-Cayeros, Magaloni, & Weingast, 2002, p. 202). Patron–client
relationships are also enlightening for some of the cases, which could otherwise have
been seen ‘irrational’. The compliance of low-status actors to higher authority and the
reluctance of these actors to form horizontal alliances with their peers can only be
grasped through the prism of patron–client relationships (Kaufman, 1974; Powell, 1970).
Clientelism is extant both in developed and developing countries (Magaloni, Diaz-Cayeros,
& Estevez, 2007, p. 182). Contrary to earlier works on clientelism (such as Lemarchand & Legg,
1972; Scott, 1972), patron–client relationships do not simply wither away with enhancements
in socioeconomic development and political institutions. They usually evolve into new forms,
as seen in the cases under analysis in this research.
A division between rural and urban modes of clientelism can be helpful to grasp this
sociopolitical phenomenon even better. According to Kitschelt (2000), these two types
of clientelism stand on the two ends of the spectrum. On one hand, we observe normative
bonds of deference and loyalty in rural clientelism. On the other, there is competition
between providers of selective and particularistic incentives in urban clientelistic settings.
Rural-traditional clientelism calls for the Weberian ‘traditional authority’, where ‘the person
exercising power is not a superior, but a personal chief’ (Weber, 1957). This type of clien-
telism is observed mostly in underdeveloped regions of many states, where affluence,
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literacy, and modes of communication are not well-developed. In this regard, rural ‘patron’
acts as a bridge between commoners and the outside world (e.g. Lerner, 1958). In rural
areas, we observe affective ties between patrons and their clients. Intrinsic reciprocity
(rather than instrumental reciprocity) is central in rural patronage systems (cf. Finan &
Schechter, 2012).1 Clientelistic ties in rural areas are usually buttressed by ritual gift
exchanges, which create a feeling of obligation among recipients (and lower defection).
The ‘moral’ part of the story about rural patron–client relationships is emphasized
heavily by local patrons so as to achieve the highest levels of adherence and commitment
by the rural population. In an interesting study, Hicken (2007) finds out that a Buddhist
monk in rural Thailand declared that it was immoral to take money from one candidate
and vote for another.
On the other hand, urban forms of patron–client relationships revolve around a more
Downsian framework, where political parties and party leaders are motivated by the
desire for power, income, and prestige that accrue to those who gain and hold political
office (Wilson, 1961). Political machines are central to urban clientelism. Machine politics
is dedicated to mobilizing votes or demobilizing opposition for the purpose of winning
elections and the spoils of office. Material inducements such as jobs are exchanged for
the votes of low-skilled citizens, lucrative contracts for project are exchanged for financial
support from the entrepreneurial class, and favours in administration of law are exchanged
for votes (Keiser, 2001).
The need of vast institutional networks for political machines are exemplified in many
cases, such as the koenkai (affiliate local organization) system in Japanese politics or high
levels of success for the Peronist Party in areas with dense party organizations (Auyero,
1999; Grzymala-Busse, 2008; Stokes, 2005). The span of urban clientelism can affect
even ideologically based parties like the leftist parties in Latin America (Coppedge,
2001; Grzymala-Busse, 2008). Ethnic parties also utilize their organizational networks in
machine politics to ensure political success (Cox & McCubbins, 1986; Dixit & Londregan,
1995).
In all of these urban clientelistic practices, we observe coercive motives, instead of
affective ones (as we observe in rural clientelism). In urban settings, repeated game struc-
ture of elections offers politicians coercive power in cases of defection, providing goods
contingent on support (Stokes, 2005). In this regard, incumbents can establish credible
threats against clients who renege on their commitments (Medina & Stokes, 2007).
However, secret ballots mostly prevent politicians from controlling the final choices of
their clients. Thus, they can be claimed to buy ‘turn-out’, not the votes (hence the term,
‘turn-out buying’) (Nichter, 2008). Yet, political machines do their best to monitor their con-
stituents, as seen in the case of Argentina where political parties use various mechanisms
(such as ballot distribution, transportation of voters to the electoral offices etc.) to monitor
the actions of their constituents quite effectively, if not perfectly (Manzetti & Wilson, 2007;
Stokes, 2005). Table 1 summarizes the differences between rural vs. urban modes of
clientelism.
It would be inaccurate to assume that the aforementioned political notions of rural vs.
urban modes of clientelism are strictly separate and totally unrelated to each other. Surely,
increased institutionalization of party organization in many countries enables political
parties to reach out citizens even in the most rural areas. Or, urban modes of clientelism
in some shanty towns bear resemblances to certain notions of rural clientelism (such as
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affective ties between patrons and clients) due to geographical seclusion in some metro-
politan cities. In fact, the rural–urban divide in clientelism should be seen in a continuum,
rather than two separate pockets of political vacuum. Yet, understanding the division and
the underlying reasons behind rural and urban forms of clientelism can still be fruitful to
comprehend the nature of political contestation in many countries, both at the local and
national level. As we will see in the next section, certain regions in many countries (exem-
plified with Andalucía in Spain and Southeastern Anatolia in Turkey) can be more prone to
rural modes of clientelism due to geographical seclusion, economic underdevelopment,
and weaker political institutionalization. On the other hand, higher urbanization, industri-
alization, and economic affluence can trigger news forms of clientelism. It would be mis-
leading to assume that same forms of patronage systems apply to all regions of a state. To
this end, in-depth historical and sociopolitical analysis of different regionswithin states can
offer us a more thorough picture about clientelism in general, which would then be helpful
to grasp the political systems of countries as a whole. This research intends to offer such an
analysis about the patron–client relationships in three South European countries, namely
Greece, Spain, and Turkey.
3. Case studies: Greece, Spain, and Turkey
This study focuses on the patron–client relationships in Greece, Spain, and Turkey. The
selection of these cases enables an intriguing and illuminating comparison of patronage
systems in different political and socioeconomic contexts. A comparative study that
focuses on Greece, Spain, and Turkey also sheds lights about clientelism in Southern
Europe.
It would be appropriate to start with a brief discussion of sociopolitical changes in these
three countries over time. As Table 2 shows, all of the three cases have urbanized consider-
ably since the 1960s, particularly Greece and Spain. Yet, approximately 20–30% of the
overall population of these three countries still live in rural areas. Furthermore, as the
article will discuss in greater detail, rural modes of clientelism are more prevalent in
Table 1. Differences between rural vs. urban modes of clientelism.
Rural clientelism Urban clientelism
Normative bonds of deference and loyalty Competition between different providers of selective and
particularistic incentives
Weberian traditional authority Downsian motivations for political power
Affective ties between patrons and clients (ritual gift
exchanges; moral obligation)
Political machines (more material inducements such as
jobs)
Intrinsic reciprocity Instrumental reciprocity
Underdeveloped and/or secluded regions Usually in urban periphery (shanty towns)
Table 2. Rural vs. urban populations in Greece, Spain, and Turkey since 1960.
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Greece 44.06 55.94 35.78 64.22 30.66 69.34 28.53 71.47 27.28 72.72 23.71 76.29
Spain 43.43 56.57 33.96 66.04 27.21 72.79 24.65 75.35 23.74 76.26 21.56 78.44
Turkey 68.49 31.52 61.77 38.23 56.22 43.78 40.80 59.20 35.26 64.74 29.29 70.72
Note: The former figures (shown in grey) for each time period refer to rural population for respective countries, whereas the
latter ones (shown in white) are percentages of urban population. Source: World Bank Database, http://data.worldbank.org/.
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certain regions in these countries (Andalucía and Galicia in Spain and Eastern and South-
eastern Anatolia in Turkey) due to geographical seclusion and historical antecedents.
Hence, a clear distinction between rural vs. urban modes of clientelism in these three
countries would help us better understand both the local- and national-level politics in
these states.
There are various reasons to study these three countries in a comparative setting. First,
these countries have shared many common features in their political history such as
authoritarian regimes, coups, pronunciamientos, and many other undemocratic, quasi-
democratic, or anti-democratic practices (Malefakis, 1995; McLaren, 2010), as well as the
‘third-wave’ of democratic transition (Huntington, 1996). Of course, there are differences
among these countries too. For instance, Greece and Spain can be considered as conso-
lidated democracies (Gunther, Diamandouros, & Pühle, 1995) whereas Turkey has still
some areas that limit its prospects for consolidation such as the ongoing (though weaken-
ing) legacies of the 1980 military coup (Özbudun, 1996) or the growing authoritarian tone
of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) (Özbudun, 2014). Yet, these differences
do not hold us from offering a comparative perspective. In fact, some divergent paths
these countries follow allow us to single out the forces behind the life cycle of their
patron–client relationships. Second, Greece, Spain, and Turkey are Southern European
and Northern Mediterranean countries, all of which are in the middle of a region that
has brought about one of the most intriguing cases on clientelism. This gives the oppor-
tunity to utilize a considerable body of literature on these countries. Third, and linked to
the first two points, two of these nations, that is, the Greeks and the Turks shared long
periods of common history under the Ottoman rule (Clogg, 2010). Although the former
was among the ruled and the latter was the ruler nation in general, we will see that cen-
turies of the Ottoman reign led to many commonalities among these two nations on many
aspects, including clientelism.
Patron–client relationships have existed in many countries, even in the most developed
ones. But the phenomenon seems to have been more widespread and entrenched in the
Southern European countries. In fact, according to some researchers, it did not diminish
with time, but either retained or increased its strength during the twentieth century in
these countries (Diamandouros, Gunther, Sotiropoulos, & Malefakis, 2006, p. 17). As we
will see in the succeeding portions of this research, patronage networks have existed in
all of the three countries despite some changes through time.
3.1. Greece: from Kodjabashis/Tzakia to Kommatarkhis
To be able to understand the history of patron–client relationships in Greece, we should go
back to the times of the Ottoman Empire. Ottomans ruled their subjects through themillet
system, which was based on religious confession, rather than ethnic origin. The Ottomans
called the Orthodox millet, which was the second largest after the Muslim millet, as the
millet-i Rum or the ‘Greek’ millet. ‘This was something of a misnomer for, besides the
Greeks, it embraced all the Orthodox Christians of the Empire, whether they were Bulgarian,
Romanian, Serb, Vlach, Albanian or Arab’ (Clogg, 2010, p. 10). During the early phases of the
nineteenth century, the Ottoman rule in the Balkans started to decay, which coincided with
a rise of a small but influential group of Greeks into positions of power in the highest reaches
of the Ottoman state.
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As Clogg (2010, pp. 20–21) suggests:
These were the Phanariots, who were drawn from a handful of families of Greek or Hellenized
Romanian and Albanian origin. These Phanariots not only monopolized the office of principal
interpreter to the Porte, but also acted as interpreters to the kapudan pasha, or admiral of the
Ottoman fleet, and in this capacity came to act as the de facto governors of the islands of the
Archipelago.
Besides the Phanariots who generally resided in Istanbul, Turkish overlords ruled Greece
through local notables (i.e. kodjabashis), serving as intermediaries between the Ottoman
state and Greek peasants.
Patronage had originally developed as a kind of defense mechanism against the harshness,
and particularly the arbitrariness, of the Ottoman system of government. There was a need
for patrons and protectors to mediate with the Ottoman authorities and to mitigate the capri-
ciousness of the judicial system. (Clogg, 2010, p. 61)
One may expect to see the end of rural patron–client relationships after the demise of the
Ottoman rule in Greece. Yet, it is not what the history brought about. After the Greek
liberation in 1830, these relationships transformed but persisted where oligarchic families
(tzakia) relied heavily on patronage and clientelism to control the voting processes
(Kourvetaris & Dobratz, 1987; Mouzelis, 1978). In fact, ‘patronage proved wholly compa-
tible with the formal institutions of parliamentary democracy. The local kommatarkhis or
political boss simply took over the role of the Ottoman ağa (chief)’ (Clogg, 2010, p. 61).
With rapid socioeconomic modernization and urbanization during the 1950s and 1960s
and the establishment of mass party organizations in Greece, traditional clientelist control
by local notables gave way to a new form of clientelism in which the party leadership
played the definitive role in allocating state spoils. To be more specific, the two major
political parties, Nea Demokratia and PASOK manipulated political business cycles by
increasing social welfare payments in exchange for votes (Garcia & Karakatsanis, 2006,
pp. 102–122). This situation continued in the later phases of the twentieth century.
At this point, a Harvard economist-turned-politician, Andreas Papandreou requires
specific attention. According to many researchers, Andreas Papandreou played a critical
role on the continuity of patron–client relationships in Greece. According to Gunther
and Diamandouros (2001, p. 397), the populism of Andreas Papandreou, who dominated
party politics and government throughout the 1980s, coupled with the clientelism that
permeated both PASOK and Nea Demokratia until the early 1990s, deterred both major
parties from modernizing reforms. Writing an assessment about Andreas Papandreou,
Clogg (1995) comes up with the question: ‘Why did such a highly sophisticated and edu-
cated man behave like an old-fashioned kommatarkhis, or party boss, treating his party as
his personal fiefdom?’ In the same analysis, Clogg categorizes Papandreou as ‘the last of
the dinosaurs, as the Greeks call their geriatric ruling caste, rather than the first of the
modernizers’.
Traditional patron–client relationships in Greece, with roots in agricultural society, have
been transplanted into the urban centres and continue to enjoy a high level of popular
acceptance even today (Garcia & Karakatsanis, 2006, p. 89). This new form of patron–
client relationships has permeated society at all levels and it continues to be a pronounced
feature of society (Clogg, 2010, pp. 59–61). In general, we can sum up that rural patron–
client relationships in Greece are transformed into new forms of clientelism.
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Socioeconomic modernization and growing rates of urbanization, coupled with the
genesis of mass party organizations brought about the weakening of traditional
patron–client relationships, which are replaced by pervasive urban patron–client relation-
ships led by party bosses.
Recent studies on Greek politics and patron–client relationships centre on some critical
issues. For instance, it is claimed that patronage politics affects the creation and develop-
ment of civil society. Sotiropoulos (1996) argues that civil society and bureaucracy are still
rather weak in contemporary Greece because they are both under the tutelage of very
strong political parties, which utilize extensive patronage systems. In another important
area of study, authors analyse the difficulties of state reform replete with patronage net-
works. As Tsoucalas (1978) maintains, some attempts have been made to reform the state
and uproot the clientage relations from Greek politics (such as the ones by Charilaos Tri-
koupis) yet mostly other structural factors (e.g.: strong two-party system that benefited
from clientelistic networks; see Lyrintzis, 1984) prevented the total achievement of the
goals of such reforms. Specifically, Mavrogordatos (1997) claims that PASOK’s accession
to power in 1981 brought about a quantum leap in party patronage, and the transform-
ation of traditional clientelism to extensive machine politics and ‘bureaucratic clientelism’
(through distribution of state resources and political favours to party supporters) in Greece
(see also, Lyrintzis, 1987). Even after the weakening of the two-party system in recent years
and the rise of other political parties such as SYRIZA (the Coalition of the Radical Left),
Greek political system is still prone to clientelistic practices, specifically through
machine politics.
3.2. Spain: still the ‘land’ of caciques?
The patron–client relationships in Spain can be traced back to the caciquismo system. Caci-
quismo is a form of patron–client relationship based upon reciprocal bonds between illit-
erate, poorly educated peasants, and local notables (Carr, 1966; Forner Muñoz, 1997).
Cacique, the local elite, acted as a liaison between the villagers and the outer world
through his literacy and personal networks.
There are some reasons why the caciquismo system was more rampant in certain
regions of Spain. First, the geographic location of localities proves to be very important.
Peasants in Northern Spain tended to own their own land with minimal class differences
whereas the rural populations of Andalucía, Extremadura, and La Mancha were predomi-
nantly landless day labourers, employed in huge latifundia (Gunther, Montero, & Botella,
2004, p. 139). Thus, we can argue that land distribution in rural regions profoundly affected
the social conditions in the society. Second, the size of the town or village is also an impor-
tant variable (Gunther et al., 2004, p. 139). In this regard, Gilmore (1976, p. 99) points out
the great differences between ‘homogenous, unanimist, and independent peasant society’
versus ‘the more complex and heterogenous town society’. Finally, we can also talk about
the technological advancements in agriculture that greatly influenced the lives of many in
rural areas. Large-scale mechanization of agriculture (Harding, 1984) and the dissemina-
tion of agricultural subsidies through the EU (Gunther et al., 2004, p. 140) have played a
role on the rising affluence of people in these areas.
Turning our attention to historical roots of rural patron–client relationships in Spain, we
see that caciquismo was rampant during the Restoration Monarchy (1875–1923),
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specifically between 1870s and 1890s (Malefakis, 1995, p. 54). Throughout this period, caci-
ques manipulated the electoral processes that brought about a ‘pseudo-competition
between the two dominant parties’ through ‘peaceful turns’ (turno pacifico) (Gunther
et al., 2004, p. 140) and virtually eliminated the prospects of a fully democratic system. His-
torical records show us that the transition from Restoration Monarchy to the Second
Republic (1931–1936) brought about an environment where economic and political coer-
cive apparatuses of the caciques (coupled with the moral coercion by the Church) were
hampered by freer and less corrupt elections and initiation of agrarian reforms (Araquistain,
1934, pp. 458–459; H.L., 1934, p. 5). Yet, the outbreak of the Civil War in 1936 and the
successive authoritarian regime led by Francisco Franco nullified the gains of the Second
Republic on this matter. The cultural and social structures of the caciquismo were restored
after the Civil War. The victorious coalition used the caciquismo system to a large extent so as
to suppress any remaining opposition, ‘discipline’ the masses, and restore the social order
(Casanova, 2000, p. 530).
During the Franquist era, patron–client relationships were pervasive in rural areas,
mainly in exchange for land speculation with the purpose of economic benefit rather
than social welfare (Garcia & Karakatsanis, 2006, p. 101). For this period, many researchers
suggest that villagers in Spain exhibited a ‘subject’ orientation (Almond & Verba, 1963;
Lerner, 1958). The caciques controlled the political processes such as elections. In an aston-
ishing interview, a villager told to Pitt-Rivers, ‘when they tell me to vote, I ask, who for, and
when they tell me who for, I vote. And if they don’t ask me to vote, I stay at home andmind
my own business’ (Pitt-Rivers, 1954, p. 159).
Caciquismo appears to have declined in recent years in Spain. The sizeable bloc of
poorly educated peasants, which is vital for this system has started to diminish in
numbers, thanks to the economic and technological developments in rural areas and
migration to the urban centres (Gunther et al., 2004, p. 141). This trend is more apparent
in areas linked to metropolitan centres by adequate transportation networks (Tusell, 1978).
Yet, caciquismo can still be seen as a theme of the day in economically underdeveloped
areas that are physically isolated from the central bodies of the state. One stark
example for this is the interior portions of Galicia, where the residents of the region are
scattered across a mountainous topography, secluded from the political and administra-
tive centres of the Spanish state (Roskin, 1979, p. 633). In rural areas of Galicia, caciquismo
has survived into the current democratic era. The local notables in Galicia still function as
‘the vehicle by which the citizen can resolve his problems’ (Gunther et al., 2004, p. 25).
Same kind of examples could also be seen in rural parts of Castile-Leon and Andalucía
(Gunther et al., 2004, p. 141). Of course, it would be incorrect to claim that caciquismo is
only confined to these areas. In fact, some researchers claim a new form of caciquismo,
that is, caciquismo de partido (party caciquismo), which refers to close-knit ties of local
party organizations and the implementation of public policy at the local level, exemplified
by the distribution of unemployment compensation and agricultural subsidies is more
prevalent nowadays (Cazorla, 1996). If this statement is correct, we can assert that caci-
quismo in rural areas has generally evolved into new forms of patronage.
Overall, we observe a transformation of patron–client relationships in Spain from rural
areas to urban settings. The growing urbanization rates in Spain have altered the latifundist
zones in the country and brought about massive migrations to the industrial cities such as
Catalonia, Basque Country, and Madrid (Gunther et al., 2004, pp. 68–74). In this process, we
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also see a transformation of caciques into other positions in urban life, such as ‘jobbers’.
According to a relatively recent study, these jobbers supply factories and workshops
with low-skill workers through a wide network of neighbourhood and kin ties (Narotzky,
2000, p. 6).
By and large, the rural patron–client relationships in Spain, crystallized by the caci-
quismo system, have started to lose its momentum. However, we observe a substitute
for this system nowadays, namely caciquismo de partido in the countryside. Besides, urban-
ization and socioeconomic development altered the patron–client relationships and
skewed the balance to more urban instances of patronage, as exemplified by the
‘jobbers’ in contemporary Spain.
3.3. Turkey: the continuation of rural patronage and the birth of urban
patronage
To understand the patron–client relationships in Turkey, we should go back to the emer-
gence of Turkish political parties during the reign of Young Turk movement (1908–1918).
From this period on, most Turkish political parties have been ‘internally created’ within the
circle of the governing elites. In local politics, this situation is reflected with the dominance
of the leadership positions by the members of notable families (especially at the sub-pro-
vince level) (Sayarı, 1976, pp. 187–196).
Besides the creation of political parties, another issue is worth mentioning, which is the
schism between centre and periphery in Turkey. The divide between the ‘centre’ and the
‘periphery’ in Turkey has its roots in the Ottoman era. The Ottoman ‘centre’, which con-
sisted of the intellectuals, the upper bureaucracy, and the military first emulated the
Persian urban culture (e.g. elements of bureaucracy, language etc.) and then adopted a
Western life style (Mardin, 1973). Western culture, which is also espoused by the elites
of the Turkish Republic left the culture of the local notables and the peasants largely
untouched. In this centre-periphery cleavage, orthodox Islam found itself on the side of
the periphery against an increasingly secularized ‘centre’ (Mardin, 1973, pp. 178–179),
both during the demise of the Ottoman rule and throughout the establishment of the
new Turkish state, which effectively abolished the institutions of sultanate and caliphate
and created the secular republican rule led by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. One-party regime
by the Republican People’s Party (CHP in Turkish) continued until 1945 when Ismet
Inönü, head of the ruling CHP allowed the formation of opposition parties (Rustow,
1966). This gave rise to the Democratic Party (DP in short), which was founded in 1946.
The local support base of the DP was comprised of landowners, small merchants, religious
leaders, and many local notables who opposed the secularist policies of the CHP (Leder,
1979, p. 84). This constituency paved the way for the success of the DP in Turkey’s first
free multi-party elections in 1950. Contra to the CHP’s secular policies, the DP championed
the cultural identity of ‘periphery’ and opposed to the bureaucratic oppression of the
‘centre’. To illustrate, the first electoral motto of the DP in 1946 was ‘Enough, now the
people have their say!’ [‘Artık yeter, söz milletin!’] (Karpat, 1959, p. 161). After the success
of the DP in 1950, the CHP followed the suit and established branches in villages and
small towns (Leder, 1979, p. 86). After this date, cultivation of peasant support became
an instrumental element for electoral success in Turkey. Compared to the politics in
urban centres that have been pursued via various media such as newspapers, radio,
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and television, the politics in rural portions of the country have been dominated by per-
sonalistic ties (Leder, 1979, p. 87). Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, membership to
party branches were predominantly tied to kinship groups where very few villagers
were aware of the parties’ programmes and goals (Szyliowicz, 1966). Lerner’s (1958)
seminal piece on patron–client relationships focuses on this issue. In this study, Lerner
(1958) talks about the pivotal role that the local chief (muhtar) plays in the rural Balgat
region in central Anatolia. Before this region was fully integrated into the core of capital
city, Ankara, the muhtar acted almost as the sole bridge between the villagers and the
world beyond the village, through possessing material resources (such as radio as the ulti-
mate communication device of those times), literacy, and personal ties to the city. In
exchange for the provision of various services to their clients, local notables (such as
the chief in the case of Lerner’s Balgat) created affective bonds with the local people
(Legg, 1975) and exercised governmental authority.
This is not to say that the rural population was deaf to the variations among political
parties. As Leder (1979, p. 91) argues:
While many villagers and small townsmen appear unconcerned with (and often unaware of)
ideological differences between political parties and can, therefore, arbitrarily support one
party or another, in some instances, the very nature of one or both of the conflicting solidary
groups [such as different religious sects such as Sunni Islam versus Alawite Islam] may dictate
party affiliation.
Familial ties have also played an important role in rural politics. Specifically, aşirets [tribes]
have been highly influential in the Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia. They have played a
significant role in the communal life in rural areas and also in the Turkish political arena for
long periods of time. These familial ties are often tied to large land ownership, coined as
ağalık in these regions. Ağa in a village holds vast amounts of land, which is reminiscent of
latifundia land structure that existed in the southern parts of Italy, Spain, and Portugal2
(Dubetsky, 1976). These local elites have either themselves run in the elections to be
mayors, parliamentarians etc. or have sponsored candidates that have close ties to
them (Magnarella & Türkdoğan, 1973; Sertel, 1971). Peasants in rural areas have usually
acquiesced to the demands of these landlords and embraced the political stance of
tribes (Rodrik, 1982). Combined with the large turn-out rates of rural areas during the elec-
tions (Leder, 1979), getting the backing of these landlords and tribes have been pivotal for
political parties.
It is noteworthy here to state that there are some cleavages that are highly prominent in
rural Turkey, which are also applicable to the case of tribes. In this regard, the major clea-
vages are religion and nationalism. As for religious cleavages, the main one is between the
Sunni and Alawite sects of Islam. The dominant sect in these rural areas is the Sunni branch
of Islam (both among the Turks and the Kurds) whereas the Alawite sect spread more par-
ticularly among the impoverished nomadic and semi-nomadic Kurdish and Turcoman
tribes (Erman & Göker, 2000, p. 110). In general, religion has acted as an important part
of the identities of rural populations (Atacan, 2001) and has been a salient cleavage
among tribes of different sects (Cizre-Sakallıoğlu, 1996, p. 233; Erman & Göker, 2000,
p. 111).
The second cleavage in rural Turkey lies in the nationalistic lines between Turkish and
Kurdish identities.3 As a stark example, Bruinessen (1997) points out that contrary to the
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majority of Turkish Alawites, Kurdish Alawites were never at peace with the republican
regime. This illustrates that when religious cleavages are controlled (both groups are Ala-
wites in this example), national identities can still be salient among different tribes. Of
course, one should note that the hotly debated ‘Kurdish problem’ and the military confron-
tation (though weakening in recent years) between the PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party) and
the Turkish military forces also deepen the national cleavages (Erman & Göker, 2000,
p. 100). All in all, local notables and large familial ties embodied in tribes have exploited
both the religious and national cleavages (where possible) and tried to sustain their
grip on local people through their economic and political ties. Wealth and a large
network of acquaintances have been pivotal elements for these local notables to play a
central role in politics and climb the echelons of political life -first in local organizations
and then possibly and most probably in the Parliament (Heper & Keyman, 1998, p. 263).
Although some claim that today tribes and tribal leaders cannot be as sure as they were
in the past regarding the loyalty of the peasants (on political support they need to main-
tain their stronghold), we cannot prove this with solid facts. It is true that growing econ-
omic affluence, modernization, urbanization, outmigration, and technological
advancements have played a role on the diminishing power of these rural settings
(Ilcan, 1994). Yet, no political party in Turkey has ever dared to end this structure with
bold, decisive, and long-term policies. Instead, when possible, they have exploited their
ties with local strong men to perpetuate and possibly expand their political base. To be
more specific, with the transition to multi-party democracy in 1945, Turkish political
parties pursued the strategy of political patronage to cope with the socioeconomic pro-
blems and gather more votes. With the exception of the 1961–1965 and 1983–1987
periods,4 Dubetsky (1976) almost no effort has been made to develop coherent socioeco-
nomic policies. Instead, politicians utilized their extensive local patronage networks to
obtain votes (Heper & Keyman, 1998, pp. 259–261). Additionally, the relative absence of
a ‘civil society’ in Turkey’s political structure (Karabelias, 1999) and the suspicion of the
‘centre’ elites towards intermediary groups and institutions (Akarlı & Ben-Dor, 1975) per-
mitted the political exploitation of the masses by local notables and religious leaders
through the extensive use of patron–client relationships.
As Turkey has failed to institutionalize its political regime and consolidate its democ-
racy, rural patron–client relationships have continued to be a major ingredient of the
socioeconomic and political life in the countryside. Specifically, landlords and tribes in
Eastern and Southeastern Turkey have acted as the local patrons of these areas and
exploited the peasants through their economic and political resources. Political parties,
with very few exceptions, have utilized their ties with local strongmen to continue, and
if possible, broaden their political clout. Rural patron–client relationships in Turkey are
far from becoming extinct and play a central role in politics. In a recent study, Özbudun
(2005) talks about the pervasiveness of rural clientelism, which is not be limited to
certain geographic regions. The author asserts that patronage can prove strong even in
the rural areas of relatively affluent western and southwestern regions (though under
different contexts).
Along with the rural patronage networks, contemporary studies on Turkey show
bourgeoning forms of urban clientelism. In a study that supports this phenomenon,
Güneş-Ayata (1994) claims that patronage and clientage have proven remarkably portable
and adaptable during the past century as Turkey has transitioned from a new, mainly rural
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state in which patronage and clientage existed most classically in the landlord–peasant
relationship, to a modernizing, urbanizing state in which machine politics is more preva-
lent. In a very to-the-point analysis, Hale (1999) maintains that there is voter alienation
from the political system in Turkey, where party identification is weak and electoral vola-
tility is high. This makes political parties resort to further patronage practices to ensure
their political support in this volatile environment. Overall, this creates a self-reinforcing
mechanism for clientelism.
4. Current state of clientelism in Greece, Spain, and Turkey
A comparative research that studies patron–client relationships in Greece, Spain, and
Turkey highlights interesting commonalities as well as differences among these countries.
As this research suggests, tzakia/kodjabashis in Greece, cacique/caciquismo in Spain, and
ağalık/aşirets in Turkey refer to the rural versions of patronage whereas kommatarkhis in
Greece and caciquismo de partido in Spain are relevant for clientelistic practices in
urban areas. Due to its socioeconomic development, urbanization, and industrialization,
as well as its geography, Greece usually has urban modes of clientelism. Spain also has
similar features about the current state of clientelism yet certain regions of the country,
especially Galicia, as well as Castile-Leon and Andalucía have still rural modes of patronage
systems due to their geographical conditions. Likewise, mountainous and secluded
regions in Turkey, especially Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia are still under heavy influ-
ence of rural clientelism whereas urbanized and industrialized western portions of the
country have evolved into political environments apt for machine politics.
Brief notes should be made regarding the current state of clientelism in each of the
three cases at hand. Major political parties and party systems within which they
operate, as well as the contemporary socioeconomic conditions are essential to under-
stand how patron–client relationships work as of today in these three states. To start
with, the 2008 global crisis shook the Greek party system immensely. Dynastic politics,
characterized by family ties in the Greek Parliament and linked to the persistence of clien-
telism in Greece, started to wither away with the 2012 election (Patrikios & Chatzikonstan-
tinou, 2015). The political scene dominated by two parties (PASOK and Nea Demokratia)
has been revolutionized by the rise of anti-system parties, especially SYRIZA, which has
recently come to the government in the 2015 election. Greece, as a country adversely
and significantly affected by the global financial crisis, has been provided with some
restructuring demands by the EU, ECB, and IMF. These demands have been centred on
cutting back on the bloated public bureaucracy. Yet, the political parties have been reluc-
tant to follow the advice of these international organizations, which would sacrifice the
patronage networks upon which the Greek parties have depended over the past several
decades. Endemic prevalence of clientelistic networks, which has created the background
for corruption and economic malaise is hard to eradicate from the Greek politics (Christo-
poulos, 1998). SYRIZA, as a radical left-wing party with its populist discourse, promises to
replace the corrupt political system in Greece replete with clientelism with one that cares
the interests of ‘the people’ (signified by the term ‘λαός’), especially the downtrodden seg-
ments of the society (Stavrakakis & Katsambekis, 2014). In the context of continued econ-
omic hardships and the concomitant decline in the support for parliamentary democracy
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(Teixeira, Tsatsanis, & Belchior, 2014), SYRIZA has a tough row to hoe to honour its political
and economic promises and eradicate clientelistic practices in the Greek politics.
Similar to the Greek case, the Spanish economy has also been struck hard by the global
financial crisis. The political scene has long been dominated by two parties, center-right
People’s Party (PP) and center-left Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE) (Bosco &
Morlino, 2006). Clientelism, be it in rural areas or urban centres, persists in democratic
era (Fernandes, 2014). Especially, urban modes of clientelism, particularly in the form of
‘bureaucratic clientelism’ (Lyrintzis, 1987), through distribution of state resources and pol-
itical favours to party devotees, prevails in the Spanish politics (Hopkin, 2001; Pujas &
Rhodes, 1999). Alienated by clientelistic and corrupt networks of system parties and
exhausted by economic hardships, many Spaniards have started to challenge the status
quo in recent years. In the aftermath of the 2011–2012 Spanish protests against inequality
and corruption, a left-wing political party, Podemos (‘We Can’) was founded. Similar to the
case of SYRIZA, Podemos stands to revolutionize the extant political system in Spain. In the
run up to the Spanish general election of December 2015, Podemos is currently the third
party in the polls, closely following its major contenders, the PP and PSOE. Making crucial
gains in the most recent local and regional elections in May 2015 (such as holding power in
Barcelona), Podemos challenges the traditional political parties and party system in Spain.
Much like the SYRIZA case in Greece, however, it is still a long way to go for political parties
such as Podemos to fully replace the clientelistic, corrupt networks of political power in
Spain.
In the Turkish case, the ruling AKP has dominated the political scene in the country
since the early 2000s. AKP’s current rule can be best characterized by a ‘drift towards an
excessively majoritarian conception of democracy, or even an electoral authoritarianism
of a more markedly Islamic character’ (Özbudun, 2014, p. 1). Within this political
context, the distribution of goods, services, and jobs in exchange for votes through clien-
telism and patronage plays an important role in shaping the voters’ preferences in Turkey
(Sayarı, 2014, p. 655). Politicians favour and look after the interests of their supporters
at the expense of violating the neutrality principle (Adaman, 2011, p. 314). In a recent
illuminating study, Çarkoğlu and Aytaç (2015) show that clientelism is rampant in the
Turkish society, in which 35% of the whole population is targeted for clientelistic practices
(Çarkoğlu & Aytaç, 2015, p. 2). The scholars underline that strong partisans of the ruling
AKP, less-educated individuals, and urban residents are the biggest segments of the
society who are targeted for vote-buying (Çarkoğlu & Aytaç, 2015, pp. 2–3; p. 11). All in
all, the current competitive authoritarian party system dominated by the ruling AKP
reinforces the patron–client relationships in Turkey (especially in urban settings), instead
of coping with them and replacing them with programmatic appeals.
To sum up, in rural modes of clientelism, normative bonds of deference and loyalty with
a Weberian notion of ‘traditional authority’ and affective ties between political patrons and
clients are more observable whereas urban modes of clientelism evidently bring about
Downsian competition between political machines with more coercive motives. This
does not mean that these notions of clientelism are mutually exclusive. This rural–urban
divide should be seen in a continuum. Surely, party politicking is part of the political
picture in villages and shanty towns in urban periphery bear notions of ‘rural’ patronage
systems due to their geographical seclusion. However, studying clientelism with more con-
textualized analyses that take into account differences between socioeconomic and
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geographical antecedents of rural vs. urban clientelism and their divergent political reflec-
tions would help us further the extant body of literature on this subject. To this end, this
study has attempted to provide the evolution of patronage systems in Greece, Spain, and
Turkey through the prism of this rural–urban divide. In general, it can be argued that urban
modes of clientelism (especially in the shape of ‘bureaucratic clientelism’) dominates the
political scene as of today, whereas rural clientelism still prevails in certain geographic
regions of these states. Hopefully, this study will help us promote our understanding
about the polities in these states and contribute to the literature on clientelism.
Notes
1. According to Finan and Schechter (2012), intrinsic reciprocity is a person’s willingness to sacrifice
his own material well-being in order to increase the payoffs of someone who has been kind to
him or to decrease the payoffs of someone who has been unkind to him. This is contrasted
with instrumental reciprocity, which is motivated by forward-looking self-interest.
2. The word ağa is frequently used to refer to the merchant in town as well as to the rural landlord. It
is also used in some parts of Anatolia as a form of address by a son for his father or elder brother
(Dubetsky, 1976, 441).
3. The other significant identities that play a role in rural Turkey (where aşirets dominate) are the
Arab and Zaza identities (Erman & Göker, 2000, 111).
4. 1961–1965 period was governed by the center-left Republican People’s Party. At this period, plan-
ning instead of patronage, industrial growth instead of populism, and an urban, polished univers-
alism instead of rural parochialism were emphasized (Sunar, 1994, 101). On the other hand, 1983–
1987 period was governed by the center-right Motherland Party (led by Turgut Özal). In this early
Özal period, economic decisions tended to be responsive to market signals and they were not
dictated by clientelist demands (Heper & Keyman, 1998, 266).
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